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 2.1  Introduction 
 Almost two decades since the publication of  The Embodied Mind ( Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch 1991 ), the term  enactive has moved out of relative 
obscurity to become a fashionable banner in many regions of cognitive 
science. It has found its way into diverse areas, from education and human-
computer interaction, to autonomous robotics and consciousness studies. 
On the surface, this acceptance indicates the success of the ideas articulated 
by Varela and his colleagues, and their view of the mind with its emphasis 
on the role of embodied experience, autonomy and the relation of co-
determination between cognitive agents and their world. Theirs was not 
only an achieved synthesis of existing criticisms to a predominantly com-
putationalist paradigm, but also the articulation of a set of postulates to 
move these ideas forward. Indeed, the increasing use of enactive terminol-
ogy serves as an indication that the time is ripe for a new era in cognitive 
science. To a great extent, we believe this to be so. 
 However, on closer inspection, a signifi cant variety of meaning is 
revealed in the use of the word  “ enactive ” (as happens with closely associ-
ated terms such as  autonomous , embodied , situated , and  dynamical ). The 
label sometimes indicates only the partial adoption of enactive views, 
vaguely connected to the ideas in  The Embodied Mind . In the worst cases, 
we see the raising of implausible hybrids risking self-contradiction in their 
mixture of the new and the old. There seems to be a lack of consensus 
about what constitutes enactivism or embodied cognitive science in 
general ( Wilson 2002 ). Enactive has often been taken simply as synony-
mous of active, embodied as synonymous of physical, dynamical as syn-
onymous of changing, and situated as synonymous of exchanging 
information with the environment, all properties that could be claimed 
by practically every robot, cognitive model or theory proposed since 
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symbolic artifi cial intelligence (AI) fi rst made its debut as the theoretical 
core of cognitive science about fi fty years ago. This situation can lead to 
confusion and eventually to the loss of meaning attached to these terms —
 indeed, a perceived ambiguity between revolution and reform was already 
noticed by early commentators ( Dennett, 1993 ). 
 We fi nd at least two reasons for this situation, both indicating pressing 
problems that must be addressed if enactive cognitive science is to get off 
the ground. The fi rst one is a watering down of the original ideas of enac-
tivism by their partial adoption or sublimation into other frameworks. The 
second, related reason is a genuine lack of enactive proposals to advance 
open questions in cognitive science that motivate more traditional frame-
works, such as the problems of higher-level cognition. These reasons lead 
to the misappropriation of the previously mentioned keywords through 
the acceptance of the lessons of enactivism, but only for a restricted range 
of infl uence. In the opinion of many, the usefulness of enactive ideas is 
confi ned to the  “ lower levels ” of human cognition. This is the  “ reform-
not-revolution ” interpretation. For instance, embodied and situated 
engagement with the environment may be suffi cient to describe insect 
navigation, but it will not tell us how we can plan a trip from Brighton to 
La Rochelle. Or enactive-like ideas could well account for complex skills 
such as mastering sensorimotor contingencies in visual perception ( O ’ Regan 
and No ë 2001 ), or becoming an expert car driver ( Dreyfus 2002 ), but —
 important though these skills are — they remain cognitively marginal ( Clark 
and Toribio 1994 ) and fall short of explaining performances such as prepar-
ing for a mathematics fi nal or designing a house. For some researchers, 
enactive ideas are useful but confi ned to the understanding of sensorimo-
tor engagements. As soon as anything more complex is needed, we must 
somehow recover newly clothed versions of representationalism and com-
putationalism ( Clark and Toribio 1994 ;  Clark 1997 ;  Clark and Grush 1999 ; 
 Grush 2004 ). 
 We would do wrong in ignoring such positions. They are good indica-
tors of what is at the core of the struggle between traditional and unortho-
dox temperaments in cognitive science today. Indeed, the current situation 
serves as a reminder of the dangerous fate that fresh and radical ideas may 
suffer: that of dilution into a background essentially indistinguishable from 
that which they initially intended to reject. We believe that it is mistaken 
to conclude that what enactivism cannot yet account for must necessarily 
be explained using an updated version of old ideas with a debatable success 
record. But it will remain tempting to do so  as long as the principal tenets 
and implications of enactivism remain insuffi ciently clear . It would also be 
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wrong to ignore arguments that show the limitations of enactivism. These 
challenges reveal how much is left to be done.  Enactivism is a framework 
that must be coherently developed and extended . 
 For this reason, in trying to answer the question  “ What is enactivism? ” 
it is important not to straightjacket concepts that may still be partly in 
development. Some gaps may not yet be satisfactorily closed; some con-
tradictions may or may not be only apparent. We should resist the tempta-
tion to decree solutions to these problems simply because we are dealing 
with defi nitional matters. The usefulness of a research program also lies 
with its capability to grow and improve itself. It can do so only if problems 
and contradictions are brought to the center and we let them do their 
work. For this, it is important to be engendering rather than conclusive, 
to indicate horizons rather than boundaries. 
 There are still many important areas in enactive cognitive science that 
demand serious development. These remain the stronghold of traditional 
conceptions. Most of the underdeveloped areas within the enactive 
approach involve higher levels of cognitive performance: thinking, imag-
ining, interpreting the behavior of others, and so on. For as long as enac-
tive ideas are taken as fi lling in details or as playing a contextual role in 
the explanation of such phenomena, the situation will not change. 
 We dedicate this chapter to clarifying the central tenets of enactivism 
and exploring some of the themes currently under development. In this 
exercise, following the logic of the central ideas of enactivism can some-
times lead to unexpected hypotheses and implications. We must not 
underestimate the value of a new framework in allowing us to  formulate 
questions in a different vocabulary , even if satisfactory answers are not yet 
forthcoming. Implicitly, the exploration of these questions and possible 
answers is at the same time a demonstration of the variety of methods 
available to enactivism, from phenomenology, to theory/experiment 
cycles, and to the synthesis of minimal models and validation by construc-
tion — an additional thread that runs through this chapter and that we will 
pick up again in the discussion. 
 In particular, after introducing the fi ve core ideas of enactivism, we 
focus on value generation and question the coherence of the idea of a  value 
system in cognitive architectures (both computationalist and embodied) 
and similar modular structures whose function is to generate or judge the 
 meaning of a situation. This question allows us to highlight right from the 
start one of the main differences between enactive and traditional views: 
a grounding of notions such as values and meaning. Many infl uential 
theories in cognitive science make use of the idea that value or meaning 
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is some information appraised by an internal module within an agent ’ s 
cognitive architecture, whereas in an enactive perspective, meaning is 
inseparable from the whole of context-dependent, life-motivated, embod-
ied activity, without being at all a hazy concept beyond the reach of sci-
entifi c understanding. We also explore, continuing on the issue of the 
origins of meaning, the fi eld of social cognition, the focus of many recent 
phenomenologically inspired criticisms ( Thompson 2001 ;  Gallagher 2001 , 
 2005 ). Our exploration leads us toward a middle way between individual-
istic and holistic views of social interaction and to highlighting the central 
role played by the temporality of social engagements in generating and 
transforming social understanding at different time scales through joint 
participation. In the fi nal part, we take a speculative look at the embodied 
capability to manipulate the meaning of concrete situations by exploring 
the role of play in the development of human cognition. These explora-
tions do not attempt to be complete, nor do they put the whole of human 
cognition within the reach of enactivism and forever banish representa-
tional/computational explanations. But they do extend the conceptual 
horizon and allow us to formulate the problem of higher cognitive perfor-
mance in an alternative, enactive way. 
 2.2  The Core of Enactivism 
 It would be misleading to think of the enactive approach as a set of all 
radically novel ideas. It is much rather a synthesis of some new but also 
several old themes that mutually support each other. Overall, enactivism 
may be construed as a kind of nonreductive, nonfunctionalist naturalism. 
It sees the properties of life and mind as forming part of a continuum and 
consequently advocates a scientifi c program that explores several phases 
along this dimension. 
 Among the predecessors to enactivism we fi nd, for example, Piaget ’ s 
theory of cognitive development through sensorimotor equilibration 
( Piaget 1936, 19 67 ), Poincar é ’ s theory of the active role of movement in 
the construction of spatial perception ( Poincar é 1907 ), Goldstein ’ s theory 
of the self-actualizing organism (Goldstein [1934] 1995), and others. The 
very term  “ enactive ” has been similarly used before, for example by Bruner 
in the 1960s, to describe knowledge that is acquired and manifested 
through action ( Bruner 1966 ). Equally, we fi nd philosophical affi nities 
with existential phenomenology ( Heidegger 1962 ;  Merleau-Ponty 1962 ), 
with Eastern mindfulness traditions, with Hans Jonas ’ s biophilosophy 
( Jonas 1966 ), and with pragmatic thinkers such as  Dewey (1929) . Current 
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compatibilities can be also found with many embodied and dynamical 
systems ideas in contemporary cognitive science ( Beer 2000 ;  Chiel and Beer 
1997 ;  Thelen and Smith 1994 ;  Hutchins 1995a ;  Juarrero 1999 ;  Kelso 1995 ), 
neuroscience ( Bach-y-Rita et al. 1969 ;  Damasio 1994 ;  Skarda and Freeman 
1987 ;  Engel, Fries, and Singer 2001 ), evolutionary biology ( Lewontin 1983 ; 
 Oyama 2000 ), and AI/robotics ( Beer 2003 ;  Brooks 1991 ;  Harvey et al. 1997 ; 
 Nolfi  and Floreano 2000 ;  Winograd and Flores 1986 ). Some of these con-
nections are made explicit in  The Embodied Mind , others have been 
elaborated later in the literature, and still others remain to be better 
established. 
 What is the core of the enactive approach? Views that take cognition 
as embodied and situated, or take experience seriously, or explore the 
purchase of dynamical systems ideas, will all share something with enactiv-
ism. But to call them enactive just because there is some conceptual overlap 
may only contribute to a meaningless proliferation of the term. This is 
unless we can show both that (1) such views share or are developed from 
a basic core of enactive ideas, and (2) extensions to these ideas do not 
result in irresolvable contradictions with this basic core. We can identify 
fi ve highly intertwined ideas that constitute the basic enactive approach 
( Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991 ;  Thompson 2005 ):  autonomy , sense-
making , emergence , embodiment , and  experience . Partially implying each 
other, these ideas sit on the blind spots of traditional views. We will not 
attempt to disentangle all of their connections in order to obtain a set of 
perfectly independent postulates. Indeed, the internal relations between 
these concepts speak for the strength of their association under a single 
banner. 
 2.2.1  Autonomy 
 Living organisms are autonomous — they follow laws set up by their own 
activity. Fundamentally, they can be autonomous only by virtue of their 
self-generated identity as distinct entities. A system whose identity is fully 
specifi ed by a designer and cannot, by means of its own actions, regenerate 
its own constitution, can only follow the laws contained in its design, no 
matter how plastic, adaptive, or lifelike its performance. In order for a 
system to generate its own laws, it must be able to build itself  at some level 
of identity . If a system  “ has no say ” in defi ning its own organization, then 
it is condemned to follow an externally given design like a railroad track. 
As such, it may be endowed with ways of changing its behavior depending 
on history, but at some level it will encounter an externally imposed func-
tional (as opposed to physical) limitation to the extent to which it can 
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change itself. This can be avoided only if the system ’ s limitations result 
partly from its own processes. 
 The autonomy (or freedom) of a self-constituted system is by no means 
unconstrained (being able to infl uence one ’ s own limitations does not 
imply being able to fully remove them; on the contrary, it means being 
able to set up new ways of constraining one ’ s own actions). Hans  Jonas 
(1966) speaks of life as sustaining a relation of  needful freedom with respect 
to its environment. Matter and energy are needed to fuel metabolism. In 
turn, by its constant material turnover, metabolism sustains its form (its 
identity) by dynamically disassociating itself from specifi c material 
confi gurations. 
 It should be clear that by expressions like  “ self-constitution ” and  “ gen-
erating its own laws ” no mysterious vitalism is intended. However, the 
acceptance of an operational concept of emergence (discussed shortly) is 
implied. By saying that a system is self-constituted, we mean that its 
dynamics generate and sustain an identity. An  identity is generated when-
ever a precarious network of dynamical processes becomes operationally 
closed. A system is operationally closed if, for any given process  P that 
forms part of the system (1) we can fi nd among its enabling conditions 
other processes that make up the system, and (2) we can fi nd other pro-
cesses in the system that depend on  P . This means that at some level of 
description, the conditions that sustain any given process in such a network 
always include those conditions provided by the operation of the other 
processes in the network, and that the result of their global activity is an 
identifi able unity in the same domain or level of description (it does not, 
of course, mean that the system is isolated from interactions with the 
environment). Autonomy as operational closure is intended to describe 
self-generated identities at many possible levels ( Varela 1979 ,  1997 ;  Di 
Paolo 2009 ). 
 Cognitive systems are also autonomous in an interactive sense in terms 
of their engagement with their environment as agents and not simply as 
systems coupled to other systems ( Moreno and Etxeberria 2005 ;  Di Paolo 
2005 ). As such, they not only respond to external perturbations in the 
traditional sense of producing the appropriate action for a given situation, 
they do in fact actively and asymmetrically regulate the conditions of their 
exchange with the environment, and in doing so, enact a world or cogni-
tive domain. 
 To view cognitive systems as autonomous is therefore to reject the tra-
ditional poles of seeing mind as responding to environmental stimuli on 
the one hand, or as satisfying internal demands on the other — both of 
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which subordinate the agent to a role of obedience to external or internal 
factors. It is also to recognize the  “ ongoingness ” of sensorimotor couplings 
that lead to patterns of perception and action twinned to the point that 
the distinction is often dissolved. Autonomous agency goes even further 
than the recognition of ongoing sensorimotor couplings as dynamical and 
emphasizes the role of the agent in constructing, organizing, maintaining, 
and regulating those closed sensorimotor loops. In doing so, the cognitive 
agent plays a role in determining the norms that it will follow, the  “ game ” 
that is being played. 
 2.2.2  Sense-Making 
 Already implied in the notion of interactive autonomy is the realization 
that organisms cast a web of signifi cance on their world. Regulation of 
structural coupling with the environment entails a direction that this 
process is aiming toward: that of the continuity of the self-generated iden-
tity or identities that initiate the regulation. This establishes a  perspective 
on the world with its own normativity, which is the counterpart of the agent 
being a center of  activity in the world ( Varela 1997 ;  Weber and Varela 2002 ; 
 Di Paolo 2005 ;  Thompson 2007 ). Exchanges with the world are thus inher-
ently signifi cant for the agent, and this is the defi nitional property of 
a cognitive system: the creation and appreciation of meaning or  sense-
making , in short. 
 It will be important to notice already — this issue is treated more exten-
sively in the following section — that sense-making is an inherently active 
idea. Organisms do not passively receive information from their environ-
ments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural 
cognitive systems are simply not in the business of accessing their world 
in order to build accurate pictures of it. They participate in the generation 
of meaning through their bodies and action often engaging in transfor-
mational and not merely informational interactions;  they enact a world . 
Enactivism thus differs from other nonrepresentational views such as Gib-
sonian ecological psychology on this point ( Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
1991 , 203 – 204). For the enactivist, sense is not an invariant present in 
the environment that must be retrieved by direct (or indirect) means. 
Invariants are instead the outcome of the dialog between the active prin-
ciple of organisms in action and the dynamics of the environment. The 
 “ fi nding ” of meaning must be enacted in a concrete and specifi c reduc-
tion of the dimensions that the organism-environment system affords 
along the axis of relevance for autonomy; it is always an activity with a 
formative trace, never merely about the innocent extraction of information 
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as if this was already present to a fully realized (and thus inert) agent. 
This is another idea that sets the enactive framework apart from more 
traditional views in cognitive science: a dynamical, biologically grounded, 
theory of sense-making. Like few notions in the past, this concept strikes 
at the heart of what is to be cognitive. We will elaborate this point in 
the next section and show how elusive this way of thinking can be even 
among researchers who have taken embodiment and situatedness very 
seriously. 
 2.2.3  Emergence 
 The overarching question in cognitive science is: How does it work? For 
the enactive approach, the connected concepts of autonomy and sense-
making already invoke some notion of emergence in addressing this ques-
tion. Autonomy is not a property of a collection of components, but the 
consequence of a new identity that arises out of dynamical processes in 
precarious operational closure. Meaning is not to be found in elements 
belonging to the environment or in the internal dynamics of the agent, 
but belongs to the relational domain established between the two. 
 The idea of emergence has been much debated in various domains from 
metaphysics to epistemology and has had a furious revival over the last 
three decades with the advent of the sciences of complexity. Beyond the 
debates about the possibility of ontological emergence ( Kim 1999 ;  Silber-
stein and McGeever 1999 ), there is a pragmatic application of the term 
that stems from the well-understood phenomenon of self-organization. 
This has served to remove the air of mystery around emergence in order 
to bring it back in line with a naturalistic project. There is also a demand 
for emergentist explanations in biology, in which hierarchical organization 
is all too evident (e.g., genetic regulation, cells, extracellular matrices, 
tissues, organs, organism, dyads, groups, institutions, societies). 
 Emergence is used to describe the formation of a novel property or 
process out of the interaction of different existing processes or events 
(Thompson 2007;  Thompson and Varela 2001 ). In order to distinguish an 
emergent process from simply an aggregate of dynamical elements, two 
things must hold (1) the emergent process must have its own autonomous 
identity, and (2) the sustaining of this identity and the interaction between 
the emergent process and its context must lead to constraints and modula-
tion to the operation of the underlying levels. 1 The fi rst property indicates 
the identifi ability of the emergent process whose characteristics are enabled 
but not fully determined by the properties of the component processes. 
The second property refers to the mutual constraining between emerging 
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and enabling levels (sometimes described as circular or downward 
causation). 
 We fi nd the clearest example of emergence in life itself. The property 
of continuous self-production, renewal, and regeneration of a physically 
bounded network of molecular transformations (autopoiesis) is not to be 
found at any level below that of the living cell itself. Being a self-sustaining 
bounded network of chemical transformations is not (it cannot be) the 
property or the responsibility of single components in this network. The 
new level is not only autonomous in terms of exhibiting its own identity 
and laws of transformation; it also introduces, through interaction with its 
codefi ned context, modulations to the boundary conditions of the lower-
level processes that give rise to it. 
 This phenomenon repeats itself at various levels in multicellular organ-
isms and in particular animals and humans. Variations on this theme have 
been used to describe the emergence of the self/nonself distinction in 
immune networks ( Stewart and Coutinho 2004 ); the generation, mainte-
nance, and eventual dissolution of coherent modes of synchronous activity 
in the brain ( Engel, Fries, and Singer 2001 ;  Thompson and Varela 2001 ); 
and also between these coherent modes and action/perception cycles 
( Rodriguez et al. 2001 ;  Le Van Quyen and Petitmengin 2002 ). Emergent 
phenomena, as indicated in the previous examples, can be fl eeting. Single 
acts can bear a relation of emergence with respect to their sensorimotor 
component phases. 
 Taking emergence seriously makes the enactive approach very skeptical 
about the localization of function corresponding to one level in specifi c 
components at a lower level (homuncularity) and consequently leads to 
the rejection of  “ boxology ” as a valid method to address the  “ how does it 
work ” question. Any labeling of subsystemic components and variables 
with names belonging naturally to properties of emergent levels (e.g., value 
systems, cognitive maps, emotional modules, mirror neurons) should be 
treated with extreme caution. 
 Having said all this, emergence remains problematic, due often to its 
opaqueness and the ease with which the term can be misused. The weight 
of explaining how a given phenomenon constitutes a proper case of emer-
gence remains with the supporters of this view. The very blurring of dis-
tinctions between levels that the enactive approach criticizes of cognitivism 
has allowed the latter paradigm to connect personal and subpersonal levels 
with indiscriminate ease. The properties of higher levels are thus explained 
in terms of lower-level ones, because they are already magically present 
there. For the emergentist, instead, the connection and the interaction 
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between levels becomes a problem to be addressed case by case, often by 
recourse to complex concepts and tools derived from dynamical systems 
theory. It is clear that much work is still needed for clarifying and opera-
tionalizing the concept of emergence. In this context, synthetic models 
can prove very valuable as tools for grasping emergent phenomena. 
 2.2.4  Embodiment 
 In a concrete and practical sense, a cognitive system is embodied to the 
extent to which its activity depends nontrivially on the body. However, 
the widespread use of the term has led in some cases to the loss of the 
original contrast with computationalism and even to the serious consider-
ation of trivial senses of embodiment as mere physical presence — in this 
view, a word processor running on a computer would be embodied, (cf. 
 Chrisley 2003 ). It is easy to miss a fundamental motivation behind embodi-
ment. Nontrivial dependence on the body can easily be construed in 
functionalist term, and this falls short of the more radical implications of 
enactivism. It is not only a question of moving the mind from a highly 
sheltered realm of computational modules in the head into messy bodily 
structures. So-called embodied approaches that do not move beyond this 
fi rst step remain largely functionalist and see the body as yet another 
information processing device; a convenient way to offl oad computations 
that would be too hard to handle by the neural tissue (Clark 1997). This 
is a Cartesian view of embodiment in its separation between mind as func-
tion on the one hand and body as implementation on the other. A similar 
adopted view is that of the mind as controller and the body as controlled. 
Despite their tension, these views often go together. By contrast, for the 
enactivist the body is the ultimate source of signifi cance; embodiment 
means that mind is inherent in the precarious, active, normative, and 
worldful process of animation, that the body is not a puppet controlled by 
the brain but a whole animate system with many autonomous layers of 
self-constitution, self-coordination, and self-organization and varying 
degrees of openness to the world that create its sense-making activity. 
 Indeed, to say that cognition is embodied is to express a tautology — it 
simply cannot  but be embodied if we understand the core of cognition as 
sense-making. The latter goes hand in hand with the conservation of 
emergent identities (autonomy) ultimately constituted by material pro-
cesses in precarious conditions (i.e., unable to sustain a  ‘ function ’ inde-
pendently of each other or indefi nitely). In other words, mind is possible 
because a body is always a decaying body (a fact that cannot be captured 
in functionalist terms). 
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 For enactivism, therefore, cognition is embodied in a fundamental, non-
functionalist sense although it may still nurture itself by the fascinating 
examples of how bodily structures and dynamics may be cleverly exploited 
to resolved complex problems both in human performance ( Lenay 2003 ) 
and in robots ( Pfeifer and Scheier 1999 ;  Salomon 1998 ). The relevance of 
the body is not restricted to concrete sensorimotor activities. There is much 
evidence that higher-level cognitive skills, such as reasoning and problem 
solving, mental image manipulation, and language use depend crucially 
on bodily structures ( Wilson 2002 ;  Lakoff 1987 ). 
 There are enactive accounts of the potential layering of several identities 
into a more or less integrated body-in-interaction (Varela 1997; Di Paolo 
2005, 2009). These can serve to make sense of a further twist to the role 
played by the body in the case of human cognition — one that could 
explain the resilience of Cartesian modes of thinking. Even though our 
bodies are not puppets, to say that we control our bodies is, in a sense, 
not entirely wrong. We certainly do. But we do so in subtle ways that 
relate to the emergence of forms of refl exive autonomy, this time of a 
sociolinguistic nature. Like an alien presence, I set new aims for my body 
(I decide to embrace the pain of a yoga class, I decide to go on a diet). 
Being able to support and transform new identities is one way in which 
the body creates the experience of a self not quite the same as (and some-
times at odds with) the metabolic self. Taken in isolation, this is an experi-
ence that nurtures Cartesianism. In fact, the body, by further manipulating 
its sense-making activity, is capable of putting itself in a novel situation 
that is partly its own creation. In doing so, it is playing a highly skillful 
dual role. This is afforded by the plasticity of the human body, but it 
would not be possible without immersion within a symbolic order and 
the social mediation that makes our bodies fi t to a scheme of control and 
observation of behavioral and cultural norms thus giving rise to sociolin-
guistic and narrative selves. 
 2.2.5  Experience 
 For enactivism, experience is central both methodologically and themati-
cally. Far from being an epiphenomenon or a puzzle as it is for cognitivism, 
experience in the enactive approach is intertwined with being alive and 
immersed in a world of signifi cance. As part of the enactive method, expe-
rience goes beyond being data to be explained. It becomes a guiding force 
in a dialog between phenomenology and science, resulting in an ongoing 
pragmatic circulation and mutual illumination between the two ( Gallagher 
1997 ;  van Gelder 1999 ;  Varela 1996 , 199 9 ). 
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 Many modern accounts of cognitive activity already take experience 
seriously. For instance,  Dreyfus ’ s defense of nonrepresentational skill 
acquisition ( 2002 ) is based on paying careful attention to the experience 
of undergoing a process of task improvement. As we make the journey 
from beginners to experts through practice, not only is skillful performance 
improved, but experience is also transformed. This is to be expected if 
embodiment in the enactive sense is taken seriously. If experience and the 
body-in-interaction were to relate to each other as two mutually external 
systems, we would expect either an unchangeable or a fl eeting relation 
between our bodies and our experience. Instead we fi nd a lawful relation 
of bodily and experience transformations. Becoming a wine connoisseur 
is certainly an achievable goal but expertise in this fi eld (as in any other) 
is not obtained through gaining the right kind of  information but through 
the right kind of  transformation — one that can only be brought about by 
appropriate time-extended training (experimenting, making mistakes, and 
so on). Experience is altered in a lawful manner through the process. It is 
itself a skillful aspect of embodied activity. 
 An embodied perspective results in serious attention being paid to iso-
morphisms between mechanisms and experience.  Varela (1999) and  van 
Gelder (1999) provide different, but related, dynamical systems accounts 
of mechanisms that might underlie the protentive and retentive structure 
of time consciousness as described by Husserl.  Kelly (2000) considers neural 
models of pointing and grasping that run parallel to Merleau-Ponty ’ s con-
cepts of the intentional arc and maximal grip.  Wheeler (2005) explores 
isomorphic relationships between embodied/embedded accounts of situ-
ated action and Heideggerian categories such as the ready-to-hand, break-
downs, and present-at-hand. What is interesting in many of these accounts 
is that the process of circulation is not one of assimilating scientifi c hypoth-
eses into phenomenology, but may itself inform phenomenology. This is 
as it should be in a proper dialog, and such is the methodology advocated 
by fi rst-person methods in the joint study of experience and brain-body 
activity ( Varela 1996 ;  Lutz 2002 ). 
 Experience may also serve the role of clarifying our commitments. Hans 
 Jonas (1966) looks into the world of living beings and sees that life is a 
process with interiority. Metabolism has all the existential credentials of 
concernful being. It is precarious, it separates itself from nonbeing, it 
struggles to keep itself going and preserve its identity, and it relates to the 
world in value-laden terms. However, the inward aspect of life cannot be 
demonstrated using our current scientifi c tools. This does not make it any 
less factual for Jonas. He knows that all life is connected along evolutionary 
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chains, and he knows that we ourselves are embodied living creatures with 
an inner life. This is how we can then know that living beings are forms 
of existence and that they also have an inner life. 
 This example is telling, because it already contains a diffi cult-to-swallow 
consequence of the dialog between science and experience, which is, at 
the same time, perhaps its most revolutionary implication. Phenomeno-
logically informed science goes beyond black marks on paper or experi-
mental procedures for measuring data, and dives straight into the realm 
of personal experience. No amount of rational argument will convince a 
reader of Jonas ’ s claim that, as an embodied organism, he is concerned 
with his own existence if the reader cannot see this for himself. Jonas 
appeals to the performance of a gesture that goes beyond comprehending 
a scientifi c text. The implication is that in order to work as a source of 
knowledge, enactivism will contain an element of personal practice. It is 
necessary to come back to the phenomenology and confi rm that our theo-
ries make sense, but this means that sometimes we must become skillful 
in our phenomenology as well — personally so. 
 2.3  Values and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanations 
 The previous section shows that there are certain ideas in cognitive science 
that the enactive approach clearly rejects, such as homuncularity, boxol-
ogy, separability between action and perception, and representationalism. 
In this section, we will revisit some of these themes in a more focused 
manner. 
 In everyday life, we experience the world in value-laden terms. This fact 
is hard to avoid and has been the subject of much philosophical debate. 
For enactivism, value is simply an aspect of all sense-making, as sense-
making is, at its root, the evaluation of the consequences of interaction 
for the conservation of an identity. Perhaps as a reaction to the subjective 
overtones of this issue, traditional cognitive science has not dwelled much 
on the explicit mechanisms involved in value judgment as an inherent 
aspect of cognitive activity. In general, questions about value or natural 
purposes have been dealt with separately, preferably with reference to 
evolutionary history ( Millikan 1984 ): everything living organisms do is 
ultimately reduced to survival strategies in situations like those encoun-
tered by their ancestors, or to the urge to spread their genes as widely as 
possible. In a more traditional cognitive modeling framework, this idea 
translates to values being  “ built-in ” by evolution — phylogenetically invari-
ant yardsticks against which actual lifetime encounters are measured and 
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structured, and from which cognitive mechanisms that are themselves 
independent of these values deduce the meaning of situations, actions, 
and perceptions. 
 Explanations of this kind are in tension with the principles of enactiv-
ism, in particular with the concept of sense-making. In this section, we 
juxtapose such traditional views, in which ultimate ends come in evolu-
tionarily sealed boxes, with an alternative, more enactive view that explains 
values and meanings as consequences of the kind of dynamical system a 
living organism is. We discuss an enactive theory of value in its rudimen-
tary form, which is based on the theory of autopoiesis. A number of open 
questions, such as the explanation of nonmetabolic values or transitions 
in value-generating mechanisms are raised and implications for computa-
tional models of cognition are discussed. 
 2.3.1  Values: Built-in or Constructed? 
 Weber and Varela (2002) were the fi rst to suggest a derivation of intrinsic 
teleology, natural purposes, and the capacity of sense-making from auto-
poiesis, drawing on Kant ’ s  Critique of Judgment and Hans Jonas ’ s philoso-
phy of biology ( Jonas 1966 ), and the position argued for here commits to 
this general idea. In this kind of reasoning, the struggle for continuing 
autopoiesis — in other words, survival — is at the core of intrinsic teleology 
and the capacity of sense-making. Even though survival plays a central role 
in both autopoietic and evolutionary explanations of value (one must fi rst 
survive in order to reproduce), there are essential differences between the 
claim that what affects an organism ’ s autopoietic organization is of value 
and the claim that values are built-in because they benefi t survival and 
hence have been selected for. 
 If values are built-in, they need to have some form of priority over the 
living, acting creature, either temporally or logically. Typically, claims 
about biological traits being built-in are about them being part of the 
genetic package.  “ Value ” is a term that describes the meaning of organis-
mic behavior, not one of its physiological or mechanistic properties, like, 
for instance, the blood type. Therefore, the idea of built-in values relies on 
some kind of a priori semantics : parts of the genetic code are thought to 
execute according to preprogrammed rules and, thereby, generate values. 
This automated  “ sense lookup ” is not the same as sense-making. Similarly, 
we are dealing with  pre-factum evolutionary teleonomy, not with auton-
omy. Instead of emergence, we fi nd a direct reduction of evaluative func-
tion to physical structures. Instead of embodiment, we fi nd abstract 
principles that are presumed independent of embodied interaction. Finally, 
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lived experience is subdued as secondary to historical selection pressure —
 whether value is manifested experientially seems irrelevant. The idea of 
built-in values and the enactive approach diverge along all those lines. 
 This may sound like a very black-and-white picture. Maybe not all that 
living organisms do can be explained through built-in values, but there 
are surely some basic properties and behaviors that will always benefi t 
survival, such as that oxygen, food, water, and light will always be good 
for most animals, so what is wrong with claiming that there are some 
built-in basic values like  “ water is good, ”  “ light is good, ”  “ this food is 
good ” ? The point is not to argue that such norms do not exist across indi-
viduals of a species, but rather that they should be searched for on the 
emergent level of autonomous interaction, not on the level of mechanism. 
If we imagine that a mechanistic structure inside a living organism were 
solely responsible for the generation of values, does that mean that the 
remainder of the organism is value-agnostic, that the values generated by 
this mechanism are arbitrary? Would that not imply that a mutation of 
the genetic code that tells the organism that  “ food is good ” could result 
in the generation of the value  “ poison is good ” ? For the mutant system, 
poison would then be of positive value, just as food was for its ancestor, 
even if this mutation would eventually kill it, which seems a strange idea. 
The facts that food and water and light are good and that poison is bad 
are a result of the kind of system that an organism is here and now and 
that they are of consequence for its conservation. In this sense, no muta-
tion can create the value  “ poison is good ” without changing the organiza-
tion of the system so that it thrives on  “ poison. ” The value for this 
organism would again be  “ food is good, ” not  “ poison is good. ” In other 
words,  “ good to eat ” in enactive terms is equivalent to  “ stuff I can turn 
into more of me. ” The organism is an ontological center that imbues 
interactions with the environment with signifi cance they do not have in 
its absence, and this signifi cance is not arbitrary. It is dynamically con-
structed, and that is the essence of the idea of sense-making. 
 The thrust behind the idea of precoded values, in contrast, is the 
assumption of an isomorphism between what is genuinely good or bad for 
the organism and what the executed genetic value programs say is good. 
Precoded values are thought to predict the effect of lifetime encounters for 
metabolism, on the basis of phylogenetic history. Therefore, they rely on 
phylogenetic constancies. However, cases in which we can observe a 
change of relation between a value and an organism demonstrate the 
ontological priority of biological autonomy. The most striking examples 
of such value changes — which can shatter the functionality of established 
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relations — include illness, perceptual supplementation, and other pertur-
bations to the body (distortions or impairments).  Bach-y-Rita et al. (1969) 
have demonstrated the amazing human capacity to perceive visually, 
despite a loss of sight, by relaying pixeled images, recorded with a head-
mounted camera, to arrays of tactile stimulators. What kind of preexistent, 
evolutionarily shaped, built-in value mechanism could be responsible for 
assigning the meaning sighted people make of light patterns to tickling 
stimuli on the skin when the situation does not correspond to any history 
of selective pressures? 
 Or consider a patient who, during the course of a disease, is subjected 
to increasing dosages of a pharmaceutical agent, with the result that he 
not only survives dosages of the drug that would be fatal to the average 
human being, but also that his metabolism relies on the medicine in a way 
that deprivation would cause his death. The value of this substance for 
the metabolism is inverted as a consequence of the changes undergone by 
the organism. But the transformation is not arbitrary. On the contrary, the 
kind of system that the organism becomes will determine the drug ’ s altered 
value, and this determination cannot be attributed to a local module, 
evolutionarily dedicated to the task of assigning meaning, but to the 
system as a whole. If constancies break down, we observe that local mecha-
nisms gradually undergo a change in how their function relates to meaning 
such that local processes are not anymore about the same thing they once 
were when they were selected for. We call this phenomenon  semantic drift ; 
it comes up again in section 2.3.3. 
 Even if it is true that specifi c internal structures play a fundamental role 
in the value-appraisal process, reducing the latter to the former is a cate-
gory mistake; it confounds the domains of mechanism and of behavior. 
To localize the correlated function in these structures is like saying that 
the speed of a car is in the gas pedal. 
 2.3.2  Kinds of Values 
 We propose to defi ne value as  the extent to which a situation affects the 
viability of a self-sustaining and precarious network of processes that generates 
an identity . The most widely discussed and most intensely analyzed such 
process is autopoiesis, the continuous material regeneration of a self-
bounded, self-constructing network of molecular transformations in a far-
from-equilibrium situation. Encounters will be good or bad depending on 
their effect on autopoiesis. Up to this point, our discussion has exclusively 
argued the case of this basic  “ metabolic value, ” as it seems the least con-
troversial. It now remains to be established what kinds of other processes 
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might be self-sustaining, precarious, and generate an identity, that is, what 
other processes might generate values? 
 Logically, there are two possibilities for value generation by processes 
other than metabolism itself: value generation alongside autopoiesis and 
value generation independent of autopoiesis. Both scenarios immediately 
lead to further questions. If there are self-sustaining precarious processes 
that generate an identity, but are fully independent of living organisms, 
where does teleology come from? Can we really say that such processes 
generate value, and if yes, value for whom or for what? By contrast, if such 
processes  “ parasite ” on the process of living, how do the values they gener-
ate relate to the basic metabolic value? What happens in case of a confl ict? 
The enactive paradigm leaves space for a multitude of possible positions 
on these matters; these questions are far from settled and this section 
cannot but present a few existing positions and our own thoughts in 
progress. 
 Varela ’ s own perspective on the organism as a  “ meshwork of selfl ess 
selves ” ( 1991 ,  1997 ) can be seen as an exploration into value-generating 
mechanisms, mainly of the fi rst kind — that is, based on autopoiesis as the 
most basic form of autonomy and identity generation. Identity generation, 
for him, entails that an invariant quality is maintained coherently by an 
operationally closed process whose primary effect is its own sustained 
production. Varela studied three mechanisms to bring about such pro-
cesses: autopoiesis (cellular identity), the immune system (multicellular 
biochemical identity) and the nervous system (neurocognitive identity). 
He acknowledges the existence or possibility of other levels of identity, 
reaching from precellular identity (e.g., identity of self-replicating mole-
cules) to sociolinguistic identity and superorganismic identity. Similar 
ideas are elaborated by  Jonas (1966) ; see also Di Paolo 2009. In a similar 
spirit, Barandiaran, Di Paolo, and Rohde (2009) have studied the mutual 
constraints between autonomy (such as a living organism ’ s metabolic self-
production) and agency (embodied sensorimotor behavior). 
 We want to touch on some examples from a nonexhaustive listing of 
transitions in value-generating mechanisms ( fi gure 2.1 ) that we consider 
particularly important or interesting, drawing on some of Varela ’ s and 
Jonas ’ s ideas. The fi rst three stages of this scale are frequently not treated 
as distinct. However, it has recently been argued ( Di Paolo 2005 ) that mere 
autopoiesis, according to the original defi nition, even though it is suffi -
cient to generate natural teleology and metabolic value, does not entail 
active appraisal of the corresponding metabolic norms: an autopoietic 
entity can be robust to perturbations without the logical necessity to 
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actively monitor its own state and act to improve the conditions for con-
tinued autopoiesis. Only  adaptive autopoietic entities that improve the 
conditions for continued autopoiesis, by actively monitoring their own 
state, identifying at least some tendencies that bring them closer to the 
boundary of viability and counteracting these tendencies can be actual 
 “ sense-makers. ” A similarly subtle distinction is the one between adaptive 
organisms and interactive regulators ( Moreno and Etxeberria 2005 ): 
although the former act to counter hostile tendencies by changing their 
internal organization, the latter act on the environment and thereby 
exhibit the most fundamental form of agency (cf. Barandiaran, Di Paolo, 
and Rohde 2009). An example of a just-adaptive organism is the sulfur 
bacterium that survives anaerobically in marine sediments, whereas bacte-
ria swimming up a sugar gradient would, by virtue of their motion, qualify 
for minimal agency. 
 The further stages on the scale (fi gure 2.1) are largely adopted from 
Jonas ’ s work. Animals, through their motility, exhibit the capacity to act 
and perceive as well as fear or desire for something distal. And humans, 
through socially mediated capacities such as image-making and ultimately 
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 Life-mind continuity and the scale of increasing autonomy and mediacy. 
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tively and defi ne themselves as subjects, to distinguish truth from false-
hood, and to experience happiness and frustration ( Jonas 1966 ;  Di Paolo 
2005 ). This ladder follows the  “ gradient of autonomy and mediacy. ” It 
connects increasing degrees of mediation between an urge and its satisfac-
tion to higher degrees of precariousness, and to the consequent liberation 
of ways to generate values. For instance, only a sense-making organism is 
capable of mistakes by virtue of the mediacy of urge and satisfaction. A 
bacterium that swims up the  ‘ saccharine ’ gradient, as it would in a sugar 
gradient, can be properly said to have assigned signifi cance to a sign that 
is not immediately related to its metabolism, even though it is still bound 
to generate meanings solely based on the consequences for its metabolism. 
With increasing mediacy, the possibilities to create meaning for signs 
become less and less constrained by the instantaneous metabolic needs of 
the organism. Such hierarchies of processes bringing about different kinds 
of identities and values relate to the study of the major transitions in evo-
lution like the evolution of the eukaryote cell, of sex, or of multicellularity 
( Maynard Smith and Szathm á ry 1995) . However, even though different 
organizations of living creatures enable new and more complex kinds of 
value-generating processes, transitions in structure cannot immediately be 
equated with transitions in value, the evolution of value-generating pro-
cesses proceeds in a more gradual and continuous fashion. The exact rela-
tion between complication of material organization through processes of 
reproduction and selection and the evolution of values is largely unex-
plored territory that certainly deserves future attention. 
 One of the riddles in this picture is how different kinds of values are 
tied together to form a unitary self (and whether they always do). By calling 
the organism a  “ meshwork of selfl ess selves, ”  Varela  avoids the answer to 
this question:  “ Organism as self, then, cannot be broached as a single 
process. We are forced to discover  “ regions ” that interweave in complex 
manners, and, in the case of humans, that extend beyond the strict con-
fi nes of the body into the socio-linguistic register ” ( 1991 , 102). It is cer-
tainly true that levels of value generation can be in confl ict: how can it be 
that your body will fi ght for its life despite the deliberate attempt to end 
autopoiesis through an overdose of sleeping pills? Or, the other way 
around, how can the body attack itself in an autoimmune disease, to the 
dismay of the self that is able to express itself linguistically? Here, we dis-
agree with  Weber (2003) , who seems to imply that value is always primor-
dial and one-dimensional, that is, that everything that is of value to an 
organism can be ultimately derived from metabolic value (he calls it  “ exis-
tential value ” ). Such reductions may provide adequate description for 
52 Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Marieke Rohde, and Hanne De Jaegher
forms of life that do not involve high degrees of mediacy, but not if several 
levels of value generation coexist and come into confl ict. For a smoker, the 
mechanisms of addiction may be explained with reference to metabolism, 
but it does not follow that smoking is in any way  about survival in the way 
that breathing is. 
 How do different — sometimes competing, self-sustaining, and precari-
ous — processes, spanning various levels of identity generation, often 
exceeding the boundaries of the autopoietic individual, relate to the cog-
nizing subject? Could there be genuine values without autopoiesis? These 
are big questions that remain to be solved. But it seems clear that drawing 
a box labeled  “ value ” is an unsatisfactory answer to these complex 
questions. 
 2.3.3  Modeling Values 
 In this section, we want to discuss how to model values following the 
enactive view. We see a large potential for advancing the enactive approach 
through the adequate use of synthetic models. However, it is very diffi cult 
to avoid remnants of Cartesian ways of thinking that are concealed in 
apparently innocent modeling assumptions. Partially rehearsing previous 
arguments by  Rutkowska (1997) , we want to uncover such  “ lurking homun-
culi ” in  “ value-system architectures, ” a class of architectures that feature a 
local mechanism to assign values. 
 The term  “ value system ” is taken from the theory of neuronal group 
selection (TNGS), mainly proposed by Edelman and others (e.g.,  Edelman 
1989 ). For instance, Sporns and Edelman defi ne value systems as neural 
modules that are  “ already specifi ed during embryogenesis as the result of 
evolutionary selection upon the phenotype ” ( Sporns and Edelman 1993 , 
968) and that internally generate reinforcement signals to direct future 
ontogenetic adaptation. A value system for reaching would become active 
if the hand comes close to the target. However, the point made here is not 
limited to neuronal group selection but instead extends to any model that 
features a strict functional and structural division between behavior-
generating mechanisms and mechanisms of value-based adaptation, which 
we refer to as  “ value system architectures ” in the following. 
 In order to point out the diffi culties that result from such a separation 
of value judgment (built-in,  fi gure 2.2a ) from value execution (ongoing, 
 fi gure 2.2b ), we present two examples of our own research in simulated 
agent modeling. The deliberately simple fi rst set of simulation experiments 
is described in more detail in  Rohde 2010 and illustrates the diffi culties of 
embedding functional modules into an otherwise dynamic and embodied 
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system. A mobile, two-wheeled agent is controlled by a neural network, 
which is generated automatically, using an evolutionary algorithm, such 
that the agent ’ s behavior optimizes a performance measure. This  “ evolu-
tionary robotics ” technique mimics the principles of Darwinian natural 
selection in a simplifi ed manner and is useful to the enactivist for several 
reasons. Because the performance criterion rates the  behavior of an agent 
in a given environment, not its input/output mappings, this method pro-
vides a natural account of the situatedness, embodiment, and dynamics of 
behavior. Also, although the experimenter determines function by specify-
ing the performance criterion, he or she underspecifi es the mechanism that 
brings it about — this is shaped by automated search. Thereby, prior assump-
tions about the relation between function and mechanism are minimized, 





















 Figure 2.2 
 An illustration of the value systems (a) and the enactive approach (b) to conceptual-
izing values. 
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experimenter could not have foreseen, be it due to implicit prior assump-
tions, or due to cognitive limitations in dealing with complex dynamical 
systems ( Harvey et al. 2005 ). 
 Value system architectures are inspired by fi ndings on neural assemblies 
whose activity corresponds to salient events in the agent/environment 
interaction that are interpreted as internally generated reinforcement 
signals. In order to explore just how such a  “ value signal ” could be gener-
ated, without caring yet about its function, an agent moving on a plane 
is evolved to perform light seeking behavior for a set of light sources 
presented sequentially and, at the same time, to generate a signal that 
corresponds to how well its approach to the light is being performed. 
Therefore, this value signal should go up only when the agent is progress-
ing in its task. 
 The network controller evolved to control the two-wheeled simulated 
agent is extremely simple, but strikingly good at estimating how close the 
agent is to a light source, despite the poor sensory endowment (two light 
sensors generating only on/off signals) and the consequent massive ambi-
guity in the sensory space. The encircled group of three neurons is the part 
of the structure that generates the value signal ( fi gure 2.3a ). When inves-
tigating what this  “ value system ” does, we fi nd that it responds positively 
to activity on the left light sensor, but negatively to activity on the right 
light sensor, which, intuitively, does not make sense. The successful judg-
ment can be understood only by taking the sensorimotor context into 
consideration, that is, the agent ’ s light seeking strategy ( fi gure 2.3b ). If the 
agent does not see the light, it turns to the right, until it senses the light 
with both sensors. It then approaches the light from the right, constantly 
bringing the light source in and out of range of the right sensor. In the 
end, the agent circles around the light source, perceiving the light with 
the left sensor only. Knowing this sensorimotor context, it is much easier 
to understand how the  “ value system ” achieves a correct estimation of the 
distance to the light. The approach behavior starts only when the light is 
in range of the left light sensor, and this sensor remains activated from 
then on, which explains the positive response to left sensor activation. The 
right sensor, however, is activated only during the approach trajectory, 
and for increasingly short intervals, but not once the light source has 
been reached, and therefore is negatively correlated to progress in 
performance. 
 This simple example demonstrates an important theoretical possibility: 
a value signal that correlates to behavioral success, even if it is generated 
by a neural structure that is disconnected from the motor system, can rely 
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 Figure 2.3 
 (a) The value-judging and light-seeking agent controller. (b) The successful light-
seeking behavior. (c) The deterioration of light seeking through applications of the 
principles of neural Darwinism. 
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on an existing sensorimotor context. Why is this possibility important? 
Because it undermines the very idea of top-down behavioral adaptation on 
the basis of value system judgment: by identifying a correlation between 
activity in a separate cell assembly and behavioral success, we infer that 
this module is a value system ( fi gure 2.2a ) that informs the organism if 
a performed behavior is successful. But what if this module relies itself, in 
a circular fashion, on sensorimotor invariants in order to perform its 
judgment? 
 We explore this question in a second experiment. We allow the synaptic 
weights between sensors and motors (behavior generating subsystem) to 
change in order to maximize the output of the value system from the 
previous experiment. Such  “ neural Darwinism ” is proposed as the source 
of adaptation in TNGS. We literally search for parameters of the behavior 
generating subsystem that make the agent behave so as to optimize the 
value signal. According to TNGS, this should result in an improved perfor-
mance by the agent. In fact,  fi gure 2.3c illustrates how, on the contrary, 
for this embodied value system, this type of parametrical modulation 
quickly results in a  deterioration of performance. In a system that exploits 
sensorimotor couplings to generate a value signal, if these couplings are 
modifi ed, their semantic contribution to the generation of meaningful 
judgment is gradually withdrawn, and we observe a semantic drift of the 
value signal: activity in the value system causes a change in behavior, 
which in turn causes a change of  “ meaning ” of the activity of the value 
system, which causes a change in behavior, and so on. The system described 
previously, in isolation, rewards activity of the left sensor and punishes 
activity of the right. So if the semantic contribution of the sensorimotor 
couplings is gradually modifi ed, the agent ends up avoiding the light 
source in a large circle, because this is the behavior that optimizes value 
system output, but not phototaxis. 
 This deterioration of performance is hardly surprising, given the struc-
ture of the value system and the way it works. But it demonstrates that 
value system architectures as outlined are not guaranteed to work without 
taking on board further premises. It has to be ensured that a value system 
estimates performance independently of the presence of reciprocal causal 
links, feedback loops, and semantic drift of local structures. If a value 
system is implemented in a rigid context, as it has been done in some 
robots with a limited behavioral domain ( Verschure et al. 1995 ), the 
meaning of the signal can be preserved as independent of the modulation 
of behavior, such that the proposed circuits of adaptation do indeed work. 
However, in order to be convincing as a biological theory, it is necessary 
to specify how such a rigid wiring and  “ disembodiment ” of value systems 
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is realized in a living organism that is in constant material fl ux and embed-
ded in multiple reciprocal loops with the environment. This is exactly the 
kind of problem that classical computationalist approaches have failed to 
answer satisfactorily. Indeed, we see value systems, because of their disem-
bodied nature and top-down supervision of adaptation, as leftovers from 
a Cartesian mode of thinking. Such leftovers are not surprising; decades of 
exercising a computationalist methodology persist in the very language 
used to formulate questions. 
 An enactive approach, however, is based on the idea that values self-
organize and emerge from a constantly varying material substrate. They 
are not reduced to local physical structures, such as a value system, and 
therefore there are no problems of explaining the semantic rigidity of 
material subunits. 
 We now discuss an evolutionary robotics experiment that we conceive 
of as a fi rst step toward a model of sense-making ( Di Paolo 2000b ). The 
task and agent are similar to the experiment described earlier, that is, 
seeking a sequence of different light sources (see  fi gure 2.4a for a sketch of 
the agent). The controller consists of a network of homeostatic units, that 
is, neurons that regulate their connections to other neurons so that their 
own activity is maintained within a target range. This regulation is achieved 
by inducing local changes in the weighted connections, a design that is 
inspired by  Ashby ’ s homeostat ( 1960 ). These networks were set up to 
achieve both phototaxis and internal homeostasis by artifi cial evolution. 
 Every displacement of the light source (peaks in distance) is followed 
by a quick approaching behavior ( fi gure 2.4b ). The interesting fact about 
this agent is that it adapts against left/right swapping of its sensors, a situ-
ation that it has not been explicitly evolved to cope with ( fi gure 2.4c ): even 
though initially, the agent moves away from the light source — as we would 
expect if the visual fi eld is inverted — over time it changes its behavior back 
to approaching the light; that is, the agent  reinterprets its sensory channels 
according to the alterations of sensorimotor coupling it experiences, even 
though it had never been subjected to such alterations during evolution. 
 To what extent can these experiments be seen as more enactive than 
value system architectures? First, we ask: why does adaptation to visual 
inversion occur at all? Like in Bach-y-Rita ’ s tactile vision system, there is 
no previous evolutionary history to explain how appropriate sense is made 
of a novel situation. Internal homeostasis acts as a dynamical organization 
trying to conserve itself, a minimal case of a self-sustained identity. The 
changes thus introduced can be said to conserve the  autonomy of the neural 
process (see also Di Paolo and Iizuka 2008). This conservation has been 
linked through evolution to behavioral performance, that is, phototaxis. 
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Hence light is of positive value for this agent. When the body is disrupted, 
performance is disrupted as well, which can only be  “ interpreted ” by the 
autonomous dynamics as a challenge to its conservation. The recovery of 
homeostasis results also in the reinterpretation of the sensorimotor cou-
pling (and eventually in the regaining of phototaxis). However, the posi-
tive value of light demonstrated by the adaptive process cannot be 
reduced to the local plastic dynamics; it  emerges through the ongoing 
internal and interactive dynamics of the agent in its environment. The 
meaning of light sensor activity and its functional role for phototaxis is 
dynamically constructed during the interaction. This minimal dynamic 
 sense-making is very different from the a priori semantics of value systems 
we illustrated in our fi rst model, which have to be protected from semantic 
drift. We fi nd stability of neural dynamics, even if the system is not explic-
itly designed to serve as adaptation mechanism for a particular class of 
predicted problems, and this emergent meaningful adaptation can be 
explained through the study of mechanism and the parallel study of the 
behavior it brings about. 
 This example also demonstrates the usefulness of simulation modeling 
as a method for the enactive framework by showing how problems of 
functional reduction can be avoided, and even some degree of dynamical 
autonomy can be achieved that brings about adaptation through emergent 
value generation. 
 2.4  Enacting Social Meaning: Participatory Sense-Making 
 In this section, we explore what an enactive approach to social understand-
ing would look like. Some authors have suggested ways of conceptualizing 
social understanding that touch upon some of the enactive ideas outlined 
in section 2.2. For  Gallagher (2001) , for instance, the basis of social under-
standing lies in the abilities of primary intersubjectivity (see also  Trevar-
then 1979 ). These include intentionality detection, the detection of eye 
direction, imitation, the perception of emotion, and meaning in postures 
 Figure 2.4 
 Experiments in homeostatic adaptation using a two-wheeled light seeking agent (a). 
The agent ’ s distance to a long series of light sources is plotted as a function of time 
both for the case of normal (b) and inverted (c) visual fi elds. In (b), the agent 
approaches each new source of light that replaces the old one; in (c), immediately 
after sensors are inverted, the agent moves away from new light sources in its vicin-
ity until adaptation ensues and light seeking behavior is recovered. 
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and movements.  Thompson (2001) has suggested that we understand each 
other as part of an ongoing  “ self-other codetermination ” that takes place 
when we are in interaction. But these approaches can be elaborated further. 
As with the case of values, the one important question that needs an 
answer before we can say that we grasp social understanding is:  where does 
meaning come from? Current mainstream representational approaches do 
not give an answer to this question, nor do many embodied alternatives. 
The enactive approach, as we have seen, offers the concept of sense-making 
to address this issue. This section explains the kind of specifi c answer we 
can expect from an enactive approach to social cognition. One thing is 
clear:  interaction dynamics as well as a specifi c notion of  autonomy will play 
a crucial role in it. 
 2.4.1  Toward Enactive Social Understanding 
 Before laying out our proposal for an enactive approach to social under-
standing, let us examine the gaps in traditional takes on social cognition. 
The underlying assumption of central paradigms such as Theory of Mind 
theory (ToM) and simulation theory is that minds are enclosed and opaque, 
and hence others are puzzles for us to solve. The proposal of ToM is that 
we cognitively fi gure out others: we understand others by applying a capac-
ity to draw logical inferences to sets of knowledge and perceptions. Simula-
tion theory was proposed in reaction to what is thought of as the  “ cold 
reasoning ” of ToM. We fi nd out about what another is thinking or doing 
through an internal simulation of their behavior. Simulation comes in 
roughly two guises. There is Gordon ’ s radical simulationism, in which we 
act out the other ’ s stance (Gordon 1996), that is, we  “ become the other ” 
for a short while in order to understand her. On the less radical version of 
simulation, we imagine ourselves in the shoes of the person we are trying 
to understand. The different versions of ToM and of simulation theory all 
presuppose a thorough disconnection between subjects and an internalist 
(thus hidden) view of intentions. In a social situation, we are confronted 
with an impenetrable other and so we fi nd ourselves again and again 
thrown upon our own resources of reasoning and/or imagination. 
 Apart from suffering from internal contradictions, in this kind of 
approach the body plays no role of any signifi cance. Issues of autonomy, 
emergence, and self-organization also remain untouched. As regards sense-
making, meaning is supposedly derived from good old-fashioned infor-
mation processing. Experience could be said to come into simulation 
approaches, but we would have to wax very lyrical about it — too much 
so — for the kind of experience implicated here to be anything like what it 
is understood to mean in an enactive approach. 
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 Alternatives to both mind-reading and simulation approaches have 
been suggested. Gallagher, for instance, has criticized both because of their 
assumption that minds are private. Instead, he says, what we think, intend, 
desire, and so on is practiced, expressed and recognized in our body 
(Gallagher 2001, 2005). According to Gallagher,  “ in most intersubjective 
situations we have a direct understanding of another person ’ s intentions 
because their intentions are explicitly expressed in their embodied actions, 
and mirrored in our own capabilities for action ” ( 2005 , 224). Basically, we 
know others because of our own embodied experience — not so much 
because their bodies look like ours, but because we experience them as 
other persons through our own bodies. We are not confronted with an 
object to dismantle, but with someone that we already relate to at a very 
basic, bodily level. But proposals of embodied social cognition like these 
have a drawback: they often presuppose coupling between persons. Because 
of this,  how people interact does not in itself become an explicit topic for 
investigation. 2 
 But if we are to investigate social understanding along enactive lines, 
we need to pay special attention to the process of social interaction ( De 
Jaegher 2006 ). Therefore, we suggest that, in order to understand social 
cognition, the embodied aspects investigated by several researchers need 
to be supplemented by an investigation of social interaction, in analogy 
with the interaction between agent and world described in section 2.2. In 
order to fully understand how meaning comes about in social understand-
ing, we need not only to focus on the embodiment of interactors, but also 
on the interaction process that takes place between them. 
 There have been suggestions along these lines.  Hobson (2002) , for 
example, discusses  “ interpersonal engagement ” or the intersubjective 
sharing of experiences that forms the fertile ground for the development 
of our capacity for thinking. There is also a large amount of research on 
dialog and interaction (see e.g., Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974; 
Goffman 1983; Kendon 1990). This work has generated interesting results, 
but the research in these fi elds has often been geared toward notes on 
empirical fi ndings, more than toward generating theoretical principles of 
communication or interaction. In order to start providing the latter, we 
need to look more concretely at the mechanism of social interaction as 
such. 
 2.4.2  Interaction and Coordination 
 An enactive approach to social understanding starts from the study 
of interaction and coordination.  Interaction is here understood as the cou-
pling between an agent and a specifi c aspect of its world: another agent. 
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Interaction is the mutual interdependence (or bidirectional, co-regulated 
coupling) of the behaviors of two social agents. Precisely which behaviors 
of the agents are implicated in this process will depend on the specifi c 
interaction and the situation in which it takes place (and on what its 
observer is interested in). What is of most interest right now, however, is 
what kinds of interdependence can exist. 
 In dynamical terms, systems can be  correlated ; that is, we may fi nd simi-
larities or coherences of behavior above and beyond what would be 
expected from what is known about their normal functioning. Of all the 
correlated behaviors, some are  accidentally correlated , and some are  nonac-
cidentally correlated . We are most interested here in the latter form of 
interdependence, which we call  coordination . In social situations, coordina-
tion thus refers to the nonaccidental correlation of behaviors of two or 
more social agents. It is brought about by one or more common and/or 
connecting factors. 
 Imagine two people walking down the street. Suddenly, both of them 
turn their heads. Suppose we notice that their head-turning behavior has 
been prompted by someone screaming behind them. Their behaviors are 
thus  externally coordinated , because there is a common external triggering 
factor. In the absence of such a factor, their behaviors might have been in 
a fortuitous correlation or the result of  precoordination . When two people 
turn their heads at the same time because they are both — say, for some 
strange neurological reason — set to turn their heads every hour on the 
hour, the observed coherence is brought about by a preestablished coordi-
nation: their shared predisposition for hourly head turning. Again, there 
is a common factor: an internal  “ head-turning clock. ” Common factors in 
precoordination can be of diverse origin, but often they involve a similar 
internal mechanism or shared histories. 
 Some precoordination is present in almost all social encounters, even if 
only by the existence of a common cultural background. But hardly any 
encounter, even with some precoordination, can unfold on the basis of it 
alone. Interactors need to coordinate their actions there and then. Such 
on-the-spot coordination is mostly achieved  interactionally . We therefore 
call it  interactional coordination , to refer to the fact that the interaction 
process itself plays a generative and facilitative role in the coordination. 
To illustrate, ways of greeting vary greatly between cultures, but even 
people with a common background may have to coordinate their hello ’ s 
and goodbye ’ s on their fi rst rendezvous. 
 Moreover, coordination can also make interaction more likely to happen 
and continue. An example of this is making an appointment in order to 
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meet. Coordination thus can have an interactional function. This we call 
 functional coordination . A beautiful example of this is the case of wolf cir-
cling ( Moran, Fentress, and Golani 1981 ). Sometimes, as a wolf walks past 
another one that is seated, the sitting one gets up and starts to move in 
the opposite direction. However, rather than pass each other and walk 
away, they start to move in a circle together, head to tail. This behavior 
makes it possible for the wolves to size each other up, as it were, and to 
decide upon fi ghting or not, which can be said to be the function of this 
bodily coordination. Such coordination often serves an interactional func-
tion, namely that of facilitating or continuing the interaction, whatever it 
may lead to or change into. 
 Interactional coordination and functional coordination are not easy to 
separate; they are two sides of the same coin and describe the reciprocal 
infl uence between coordinated behavior and interaction as a process. As 
an extreme case of coordination through interaction we fi nd the phenom-
enon of  one-sided coordination . This happens when an individual coordi-
nates  to rather than  with another. This distinction is further illustrated in 
the models described shortly. 
 In the following section, we discuss two examples of how to investigate 
these phenomena. We describe two evolutionary robotics models, one of 
which is based on an empirical study of  “ perceptual crossing. ” Following 
this, we connect to the issue of meaning generation in social interaction 
via the introduction of the notions of  interaction rhythm and  participatory 
sense-making . 
 2.4.3  Modeling Embodied Coordination 
 One approach to the question of how coordination between social interac-
tors may be established is illustrated by some evolutionary robotics work 
on social interaction. More than half a century ago, W. Grey Walter 
explored simple forms of social robot coordination with his  “ tortoises ” 
( Walter 1950 ). Such experiments demonstrated how a couple of very 
simple individual behaviors (such as wandering around and approaching 
a source of light) could result in complex, dance-like coordination when 
two such robots were put in mutual interaction. Recent studies using evo-
lutionary methods also demonstrate this. For instance, in a simple simula-
tion model, mobile agents must interact through an acoustic medium ( Di 
Paolo 2000a ). This work shows how different kinds of coordination are a 
direct result of the embodied interaction between agents over time. 
 The model again is deliberately simple. Two mobile agents are placed 
in an unbounded two-dimensional arena. Their bodies are circular and can 
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move by differential steering of two opposing wheels, which are controlled 
by a small continuous-time neural network. These agents are also provided 
with a loudspeaker that they use to regulate continuously the volume of 
the sound they emit. As sensors they have two microphones located sym-
metrically in their bodies, which are used to pick up any sound in the 
environment, including the sound they produce themselves. There is 
an inherent problem of distinguishing a signal produced by an external 
source and by the agent itself, because all sound signals are added up. A 
sound signal that travels through the body of an agent decays in intensity, 
so there is a signifi cant difference to the sensor activity if the sound 
impinges directly on it or must go through the listener ’ s body fi rst; this 
self-shadowing property is indeed used by many mammals to detect 
sound source location. 
 With this setup, the task set for the agents is to locate and remain 
close to each other. There are no other restrictions to the agent ’ s activ-
ity: they are allowed to evolve any kind of continuous sound signal or 
move in any way. The problem is nontrivial, because of the lack of other 
sensors and the single sound channel. Shouting at the top of their voices 
will not work, because the self-produced signal will overwhelm the sensors, 
but remaining quiet will not give any clue as to the agent ’ s position 
that can be used to achieve the task. Consequently, sound must be used 
strategically. Because of their random initial positions, coordination 
between the agents must be achieved in order to facilitate a continuing 
interaction. 
 Successful agent pairs acquire a coordinated pattern of signaling in 
which individuals take turns in emitting sound so that each may hear the 
other. They solve the  “ self/nonself ” distinction problem by making use of 
the self-shadowing property. If an agent constantly rotates, an external 
source of sound produces a regularly rhythmic pattern in the agent ’ s 
sensors, while the sensing of its own signal is unaffected. A simple embod-
ied strategy simplifi es what would otherwise be a complex pattern recogni-
tion problem. This regular pattern affects their own sound production so 
that they also signal rhythmically, and fi nally through a process of mutual 
modulation the production of sound is coordinated in an anti-phase 
entrainment of signals. Further coordination is observed during interaction 
in proximity when patterns of regularly alternate movements are produced 
that resemble a dance ( fi gure 2.5 ). Both the sound and movement coordi-
nation patterns are achieved through a process of coadaptation — tests on 
individual agents show that they are not capable of producing any of these 
behaviors in the presence of a noncontingent recording of a partner from 
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 Figure 2.5 
 Sound patterns of agents in coordination: showing turn-taking activity (a), and 
trajectories of agents in coordination (b). 
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a previous interaction; that is, they are capable of interactional coordina-
tion but not of one-sided coordination (the same result has been found in 
models of detection of social contingencies; see Di Paolo, Rohde, and 
Iizuka 2008). 
 This and similar models demonstrate that the achievement of coordina-
tion  through the interaction process is indeed something that can be 
expected to happen (as opposed to something that demands purpose-built 
mechanisms) in a broad range of dynamical systems in interaction. The 
agents in this example use their bodies and the time structure of their own 
movement to generate coordination. The generated patterns themselves 
help maintain the continuous coordination, and periods of breakdown 
followed by recovery of coordination are observed. 
 Experiments like these are sometimes disregarded because they seem so 
simple and  “ low-level ” that it seems hard to see how they relate to human 
cognition. An alternative challenge for synthetic modeling is to try to 
account for empirical research conducted on human subjects that is driven 
by a similar aspiration for minimalism. 
 Auvray, Lenay, and Stewart (2009) have investigated the phenomenon 
of  “ perceptual crossing ” in a similarly minimalistic manner. Blindfolded 
human participants interacting in a shared minimal virtual environment 
are asked to recognize the presence of each other. The only possibility to 
act is to move the cursor left and right along a virtual  “ tape ” that wraps 
around using a computer mouse. Subjects sense the presence of an object 
or the other player only through a touch sensor whenever their own cursor 
 “ steps ” on them. To make the task nontrivial, there is also a static object 
of the same size as the other subject on the tape (fi xed lure), as well as a 
mobile object that shadows the motion of the other subject at a constant 
distance (attached lure). The problem is therefore not only distinguishing 
moving from nonmoving entities along the tape using the touch feedback, 
but distinguishing between two entities that move exactly the same, only 
one of which represents the  “ sensing ” position of the other subject. 
Moment-to-moment sensory patterns therefore do not suffi ce to distin-
guish the three entities that may be encountered. Even so, recognition still 
results from the mutual search for each other. 
 Successful recognition relies on the global pattern of sensorimotor coor-
dination between the participants, rather than on an individual ’ s capacity 
to express a confi dent judgment on whether a stimulus is caused by the 
partner. When subjects encounter a stimulus, they tend to oscillate around 
it, and these scanning movements only remain stable in the case that both 
players are in contact with each other. A subject could be fooled by the 
other player ’ s attached lure, but only to the point that the other player 
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remains largely on the spot (one-way coordination). This situation is unsta-
ble, as the other player will eventually move away to continue the search. 
Only when the two-way interaction condition is established does the situ-
ation remain globally stable. Hence the solution is truly interactional, 
because it is established by both partners searching for each other but does 
not rely on individuals performing the right kind of perceptual recognition 
between responsive and nonresponsive objects. 
 We have applied the technique of evolutionary robotics to gain further 
insight into this task ( Di Paolo, Rohde, and Iizuka 2008 ). The virtual envi-
ronment and task are the same and the agents are controlled by a neural 
network. The resulting global strategy is similar, 3 but it raises an interesting 
further possibility regarding the role of interactional coordination. The 
empirical study shows that humans do not confuse a static lure with 
another subject. At fi rst sight, it seems obvious that telling a mobile stimu-
lus from a static one is the easiest task to solve in this experiment. Humans 
could, for instance, rapidly learn to discount changes to stimuli generated 
by their own movement using proprioception. The agents evolved in our 
model have another solution to the problem. If we take a closer look, we 
fi nd a striking similarity between sensorimotor patterns for perceptual 
crossing involving the other player and for scanning a fi xed lure ( fi gure 
2.6a, b ). Encountering any stimulus makes the agent revert its direction of 
movement, which leads to another encounter followed by another inver-
sion of velocity, and so forth. When we inspect the duration of the stimu-
lus upon crossing a fi xed object, we realize that it lasts longer than when 
crossing a moving partner. This is because the fi xed object does not move 
itself. Therefore the  perceived size differs for the two cases: longer in the 
case of a fi xed object and shorter in the case of a moving object. The agent 
seems simply to rely on integrating sensory stimulation over time to 
make the distinction. This can be confi rmed from the fact that the agent 
is quite easily tricked into making the wrong decision if the size of the 
fi xed lure is varied. 
 What is interesting is that the smaller perceived size in the case of per-
ceptual crossing depends on encounters remaining in an antiphase pattern 
( fi gure 2.6a ). In other words, it depends on interactional coordination. 
Hence a systematic distinction in individually perceived size (between 
objects having the same objective size) is  co-constructed during coordinated 
interaction, and in turn, individuals respond to the apparently smaller 
object by remaining in coordinated interaction. Looking more closely at 
the empirical data, Auvray, Lenay, and Stewart (2009) found that human 
participants may indeed use this strategy unconsciously to decide when to 
click. Here we see the importance of simple models as generators of ideas. 
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 Figure 2.6 
 Perceptual crossing model. Top plots show the trajectories of agents over time; plots 
at the bottom show the motor commands (dark line) and sensor input (gray line). 
Stabilized social perceptual crossing (a); scanning of a fi xed object (b). 
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 These examples demonstrate the potential of an enactive modeling 
approach for the study of social interaction; instead of limiting the view 
to what happens inside one individual, the interaction process can be 
taken seriously, operationalized and studied in dynamical terms. Thereby 
these models have the possibility to capture the rich dynamics of reciproc-
ity that are left outside of traditional individualistic approaches. The 
models demonstrate the importance of  timing in interaction and suggest 
how it can affect sensorimotor processes at the individual level to the point 
that recognizing an interaction partner is possible thanks to the interplay 
and mutual modulation between the interaction and individual cognitive 
properties. 
 2.4.4  Social Perception as a Social Skill 
 How do we get from here to meaning generation in social encounters 
between humans? How do interactors understand each other? We believe 
that meaning generation and transformation can take place in the 
processes of interaction and coordination, as has also been suggested 
by the experiments discussed. Interactional coordination and functional 
coordination can be seen as the processes by which social encounters 
self-organize. In social situations in the human world, meaning is gener-
ated continuously in the interaction out of this self-organization, in com-
bination with the histories, backgrounds, expectations, thoughts, and 
moods of the interactors. But how? 
 Our proposal is that enacting the social world relates to the precise 
timing of the functional and interactional coordination processes taking 
place in social situations. We call this timing  interaction rhythm . Interaction 
rhythm refers to the diverse aspects of the temporality of the interaction — a 
necessary, though not suffi cient, aspect of establishing, maintaining, and 
closing social interactions. Timing coordination in interaction is done at 
many different levels of movement, including utterances, posture mainte-
nance, and so on. Rhythm as a term is preferred over the more general 
 “ temporality, ” because it captures the  active role that these elements play 
in the generation and organization of social interactions. As used here, the 
term  “ rhythm ” does not refer to a continual strict temporal regularity or 
periodicity (the everyday meaning of the term), but rather to the  possible 
and actual temporal variability of timing in interaction , including, at times 
and at certain levels of behavior, regular timing. 
 Interaction rhythm, moreover, refers to the self-organization in time of 
several elements and processes that  span the individuals, that is, the orga-
nization of elements across and  between individuals. This process can take 
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on a strong role and momentum of its own; it can itself become an autono-
mous phenomenon. In order to illustrate the potential autonomy of the 
social interaction, imagine the situation of two people walking in opposite 
directions in a narrow corridor, each on their way to their respective offi ce. 
When they get close, they attempt to pass by each other. Each of them 
steps out of the way, but to the same side, so that they end up in front of 
each other and unable to walk on. And then they step to the other side, 
at the same time. And again. And again. They remain in front of each other 
for a brief time, meanwhile unable to continue on their way. Here, an 
unintended coordination takes place, and the interaction emerges and 
subsists — even if only briefl y — outside of the intentions and goals of each 
of the two people.  
 If the interaction process is like this  – sometimes autonomous and over-
riding or even working against individual intentions  – it can alter and have 
an effect on the behaviors of the individuals involved. Another example 
is the perception of object size in the perceptual crossing model. In human 
interactions, the individuals involved are autonomous themselves, and 
this makes for the complexity of social interaction. If we are to understand 
meaning generation or sense-making in social interaction, we need to grasp 
what goes on in this interplay between the different states of the interac-
tion process itself and those of the individuals engaged in it. We opera-
tionalize this interplay in our defi nition of social interaction:  Social 
interaction is the regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents, 
where the regulation concerns aspects of the coupling itself and constitutes an 
emergent autonomous organization in the domain of relational dynamics, 
without destroying in the process the autonomy of the agents involved (though 
the latter ’ s scope can be augmented or reduced) (adapted from De Jaegher and 
Di Paolo 2007, 493). 
 How can we conceptualize social aptitude in this framework? We 
propose that social skill depends on a  “ rhythmic capacity. ” This is not a 
capacity strictly of an individual, but one that comes about in interaction 
and is changed by both the interactional process and the individuals 
involved. We defi ne this central capacity of social cognition as  the ability 
to coordinate through the interaction with another person . Through such plastic 
coordination, the rhythm of an interaction can be adapted to varying 
circumstances, changes in goals, moods, and so on. This capacity is cru-
cially dependent both on the individual interactors and on the process of 
engagement that ensues between them in every interaction. 
 In this view, social perception is not about fi nding hidden intentions 
in the other but is based on the mastery of self-other contingencies 
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(McGann and De Jaegher 2009). These contingencies tend to be mostly in 
the domain of values, intentions, and affects. They are negotiated during 
the encounter itself. They arise from interlocking bodily, interactive, and 
cultural processes, and unlike most cases of object perception they are 
protean in character. The social skills that must be mastered for social 
perception are the skills of coping interactively with regularities that can, 
and often will, change unexpectedly. According to McGann and De 
Jaegher, social skill is a mastery of negotiation. 
 We cannot say who is in charge of the process of the interaction. There-
fore, here again, interactions need to be studied as wholes, plus their his-
tories. Social meaning generation relies on the coordination of individual 
sense-making. It relies on  coordination as a process , not an outcome. That 
is, precise mutual attunement of sense-makings is not necessarily the goal 
of interacting. Rather, it is the process of coordination between actions 
involved in sense-making that contributes to people understanding each 
other. 
 2.4.5  Participatory Sense-Making 
 To conclude, we propose the notion of  participatory sense-making for social 
understanding in an enactive framework. Participatory sense-making is the 
extension of the enactive notion of sense-making into the realm of social 
cognition once we have taken into account the aforegoing discussion 
about the importance of interaction (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 2008; 
De Jaegher 2009). In sense-making, active coupling with the world brings 
forth a realm of signifi cance. In a social situation, the active coupling is 
with another social agent. Social agents can be engaged in individual sense-
making, but when they start interacting, their sense-making is modifi ed in 
accordance with the specifi c aspect of the world they are now interacting 
with — another social agent — according to the specifi cations laid out previ-
ously. Generation of social meaning relies on the process of coordination 
of individual sense-making, achieved in the interaction rhythm and by the 
rhythmic capacity. 
 Not only this, but participatory sense-making also opens up domains 
of sense-making that are not open to the individual on his own. Participa-
tory sense-making constitutes a continuum from less participatory to 
highly participatory sense-making. At the former end of the spectrum, we 
fi nd for instance  orientation , in which individual A orients B to aspects of 
B ’ s cognitive domain. This is not very participatory, because there is not 
much mutuality to the sense-making. As we move away from this end of 
the range, the sense-making activities of the individuals involved are 
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increasingly mutually changed by their coordinated sense-making, and 
also change it. At the most participatory end of the spectrum, individuals 
truly intertwine their sense-making activities, with consequences for each 
in the process, in the form of the interactional generation of new meanings 
and the transformation of existing meanings. Academic collaborations are 
a good example of this. Sometimes, when the partnership is especially 
fruitful, a completely new vantage point on a problem arises, or a fresh 
interpretation of a result occurs. Sometimes it is impossible to attribute 
this development to one of the participants only. 
 It can seem as if the account we propose here is only applicable to live 
interactions. But what about observational social understanding — for 
instance, when watching a fi lm? Or even understanding someone in a 
letter exchange or in an email conversation? How does social understand-
ing happen when there is no live interaction and coordination? The point 
of our proposal is not that social understanding only happens in situations 
where the participants are physically present to each other. It is rather that 
social understanding has its developmental and logical origins in social 
interaction. Without experience of interacting in development, we would 
not reach the sophisticated forms of intersubjecitivity we have. And 
without studying interactional coordination, scientists cannot get to the 
bottom of how it is that we understand others. 
 In conclusion, using the notions of sense-making, interaction rhythm, 
the rhythmic capacity, and our defi nition of social interaction enables us 
to conceptualize social understanding as something that is enacted — 
co-constructed — in the interaction. We do not need to posit a specialized 
module in the brain, but propose to explain social understanding as always 
based on and supported by the dynamics of interaction between the cogni-
tive agent and the environment. Because an enactive approach places great 
importance on the autonomy of the individuals involved, this approach 
to social cognition, while focusing on the interaction process, paradoxi-
cally also gives social agents an autonomy and role that has not been 
thematized before: that of participation in contrast to mere observation. 
 2.5  Play: Enactive Re-creation 
 We come back to some of the problems raised in the introduction. This 
section will draw on what has been learned so far about the horizons of 
enactivism to approach the general question of human cognition (the 
umbrella term under which cognitive scientists gather conceptual think-
ing, planning, language, social competences, and so on). 
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 We have already mentioned that the impact of the enactive approach 
in cognitive science, and that of embodied and dynamical views in general, 
has been acknowledged by many sectors, but not yet as a proper replace-
ment for representationalism in what concerns higher level cognition. 
Some arguments have been advanced regarding the very possibility of a 
nonrepresentational framework for this task.  Clark and Toribio (1994) 
question how the very situatedness of action-oriented and richly dynami-
cal couplings between agent and environment is not at the same time 
responsible for  “ tying down ” cognition to the present situation. Internal 
representations, the argument concludes, will have to reenter the picture 
to account for activities that seem decoupled from the current situation, 
such as picturing the house of your childhood. 
 The argument is right in that, from an enactive perspective, such high-
level skills are indeed still unexplained. But the argument simply assumes 
that they are also unexplainable in enactive terms. Importantly, the argu-
ment relies on a misunderstanding of the idea of situatedness. To say that 
we are present in a situation with our bodies does not mean that the situ-
ation boils down to the physical couplings that we encounter, that is, that 
we are shackled to our present physical circumstances. This is why the 
concept of sense-making is so interesting. It is all too easy to interpret this 
idea in a one-sided manner — events in the world are given meaning by the 
agent — and ignore the crucial possibility that the cognitive agent may also 
be an  active creator of meaning and that such creation can be subject to 
change and eventual control by emergent levels of cognitive identity. 
 Could this point be a way of making progress in an enactive account 
of human cognition? Let us try to formulate the essence of the problem 
fi rst. What is essential to human cognition as opposed to other forms of 
animal cognition? Margaret  Donaldson (1992) formulates the issue in a 
very useful way. She puzzles about the amazing human capability of con-
stantly inventing new goals so that we invest them with value and submit 
passionately to them (sports, hobbies, record breaking). An explanation of 
human intelligence should perhaps not concentrate so much on issues 
such as, say, how we manage to do math. It should bring to the center the 
question of  why we do those things at all — when did they become valuable 
for us? 
 Donaldson describes different ways to be a human mind. As a develop-
mental psychologist, she concentrates on how transitions between these 
different modes occur throughout a lifetime. The question parallels how 
Jonas and others have treated the history of life and mind as transitions 
in scales of mediacy. Donaldson distinguishes four modes in which we 
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function as minds depending on the focus of concern. This is amenable 
to the whole of our previous discussion. To have different foci of concern 
is no more or less than to have different modes of value generation. The 
 point mode deals with here-and-now coping (most animal activity, skillful 
practices in humans). The  line mode expands the focus of concern to the 
immediate past and the possible future as well as to other spatial localities 
(understanding of immediate causes and consequences of events). The 
 construct mode produces a decentering of cognitive activity; concern focuses 
on events that have happened or may happen at some point in time or 
somewhere, and not necessarily involving the cognitive agent (induction, 
generalization). Finally, the  transcendent mode has no locus; it deals with 
nowhere, no-time (abstract thought, metaphysics). 
 These modes are manifested to different degrees in different circum-
stances and with respect to different mental  “ components ” such as 
perception, action, emotion, and thought. The modes are transversed 
developmentally, building upon previous stages. The generation of differ-
ent kinds of intention and the manipulation of our own consciousness are 
the central factors in this development. This backdrop can help us describe 
our problem as that of formulating an enactive account of how to move 
beyond the point mode and into the line and construct modes. 
 This transition indicates the development of a capacity to  “ unstick ” 
meanings from a given situation and  “ stick ” novel ones onto it (to put it 
graphically), or, generally, the capacity to infl uence meaning generation. 
This has confusingly been described as offl ine intelligence ( Clark 1997 ; 
 Wheeler 2005 ), whereas  “ decentering ” or  “ meaning manipulation ” may 
be better labels. Such a capability is indeed a challenge for dynamical 
accounts of cognition that emphasize coupling with the environment. It 
would seem that cognitive activity is  “ glued ” to the here and now in such 
accounts, that is, always in the point mode. By contrast, cognitivism sees 
no challenge in this. Manipulation of representations to deal with the here 
and now is not fundamentally different from manipulation of representa-
tions to deal with the there and then, or with nowhere, no-time. This is 
hardly surprising. Cognitivism starts at the high end of the spectrum. It is 
based on nontemporal, nonspatial, unsituated mechanisms (and conse-
quently, its own challenge is how to move in the opposite direction, 
toward ongoing coping). 
 If we look historically or developmentally for an activity that could play 
a part in this transition we must conclude that (1) it should be an embod-
ied activity, accountable for by means of the many skills that we can 
already explain in enactive terms, and (2) it should allow for ambiguity of 
Horizons for the Enactive Mind 75
meaning as well as the generation of novel kinds of value. The worst pos-
sible candidates are concrete goal-directed activities in which meaning is 
well defi ned by situational constraints. The best candidates are those goal-
generating activities where meaning is fl uid. Jonas points to image-making, 
which is indeed an excellent example. But it is already too sophisticated 
and immediately invites representational thinking. More parsimonious 
possibilities include dance, music, ritual, and play. Here we briefl y explore 
the last of these possibilities. 
 Can we sketch an enactive account of play? There is a signifi cant litera-
ture on play in animals as well as different forms of play in human children 
and how play relates to socialization, self-regulation, attachment, use of 
language, and the development of cognitive capabilities. 4 The interesting 
fact for our present discussion is that elements of the meaning manipula-
tion that this activity can afford are already present in all forms of play. 
We have already mentioned the possibility of sense-making leading to 
increasingly removed manipulation of meaning. Might not the presumed 
bacterium swimming up a saccharine (not sugar) gradient and the young 
baboon accepting to be chased around by the smaller playful infant share 
something in common? Are not both deceived to different degrees in their 
sense-making activities, the one unknowingly, the other willingly? 
 The fi rst thing to note about play is that it is hard to defi ne and easy 
to recognize.  Miller (1973) lists some properties of play, such as the repeti-
tion of motor patterns, lack of economy, exaggeration, lack of a direct 
practical end, production of novel sequences of behavior, combinatorial 
fl exibility, egalitarianism, and others. Play occurs only in the absence of 
more urgent motivations related to survival; hence it is the privilege of 
species where individuals have enough spare energy, time, and protection. 
Not all animals do it, and in those species that play, mainly infants and 
juveniles do it — exceptions are humans and species that are given safety 
through their adulthood such as cats, dogs, and domesticated monkeys 
and apes. Evolutionary explanations of play abound. They typically refer 
to benefi cial by-products such as the training of motor skills. The merits 
of such explanations must be assessed in each individual case, but in 
general terms understanding even quite  “ unsophisticated ” bodily play 
(rough and tumble, simulated pursuit-evasion, etc.) cannot be fully 
achieved without an experiential approach. Much is missed if we cannot 
understand why animals are  interested in play. Maxine  Sheets-Johnstone 
(2003) answers this question by indicating the dimension of kinesthetic 
feeling that animals explore in play: the dimension of corporeal powers, 
the  I-can and  I-cannot . 
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 The experiential dimension of value explored in this way is opened 
up by the element of social interaction and the forms of participatory 
sense-making that it affords. It is here that kinaesthetic pleasure turns into 
make-believe. Running may be fun, running from or after someone even 
more. The excitement of aggressive or sexual encounters can be safely 
explored if distinguished from real ones by appropriate signals and conven-
tions. It is this novel way of socially exploring the meaning of fake situa-
tions using real and concrete interactions that is taken to its pinnacle by 
humans in the form of pretend play. Here we are already at the other side 
of the transition, because if the arrangement of wooden cubes can be a 
house and the pen a spaceship, the root capacity of meaning creation and 
manipulation is already going strong. 
 Cognitivist accounts of pretence in play, such as  Leslie (1987 ), go very 
much in line with similar accounts of social understanding already exam-
ined, and their criticisms, such as  Hobson (1990 ), complete the parallel. 
 Piaget ’ s views on pretend play are closer to the enactive approach ( 1951 ). 
For him, the beginnings of play are rooted in the assimilative function, 
whereby new situations are coped with using existing sensorimotor 
schemas. A fi fteen-month-old infant deals with a pillow using certain 
actions (touching, laying his or her head on it, going to sleep). As soon as 
another object (a blanket) is assimilated into the same structures, it becomes 
a make-believe pillow. The infant fi nds pleasure in the assimilative func-
tion and smiles.  Donaldson (1992) criticizes this view (see also  Sutton-
Smith 1966 ). If only assimilation were taking place, the blanket and the 
pillow would be indistinguishable. There would be no reason to smile 
unless there was a simultaneous awareness of the difference between the 
two cases and the sense of  “ getting away with something. ” Make-believe 
relies crucially on the  combined similarity and difference between two situa-
tions: one concrete, tied to physical events, and the other in terms of 
manipulated meaning (the tension of this combination reappears in other 
creative activities such as making images). 
 The view of play as predominant assimilation misses out on the active 
element of construction of new environmentally and bodily mediated 
meaning. Play breaks from the constraints of self-equilibrating cognition. 
It does not have the structure of a cognitive confrontation with an envi-
ronment that places demands on the agent. Play is precisely  not a problem 
requiring a solution. In fact, play is the breaking of this pattern, or rather 
its redeployment into an active construction of meaningful action where 
no such sense-making is directly demanded from the environment or from 
defi nite internal needs. The urge to play (at least during the creative phases 
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of play) is indeed present but remains undefi ned until the activity of play 
itself helps the child make this urge clearer. 
 How is this possible within an accommodation/assimilation/equilibra-
tion dynamic? It seems impossible if we resist acknowledging the active 
participation of the child in transforming his or her world.  Vygotsky (1966) 
gives us a glimpse of how such manipulation of sense-making could 
happen. In play, the child begins to detach meaning from a situation and 
to regulate such meanings fi rst with respect to objects and later to his or 
her own actions. This is motivated by the inability to satisfy immediate 
needs. Play becomes a way of substitution for real satisfaction and a way 
of dealing with an insurmountable mediacy. Soon the value-generating 
properties of play become evident and the activity is done for its own sake. 
 “ Detachment ” is an embodied activity. It begins by relying on concrete 
similarities — a doll resembles a person — but soon these similarities are 
mostly given by the child ’ s own use of gestural schemas and not the objects 
themselves ( Watson and Jackowitz 1984 ). If something is treated as a horse, 
if it is made to move and sound like a horse, then the child accepts it as 
a horse (without forgetting that it is not one). This is the ambiguity that, 
according to  Donaldson (1992) , can produce laughter and exhilaration, the 
bringing into presence of what is not there, a cheating of  “ reality. ” 
 Once objects in the environment are imbued with meaning by actions 
that in turn demand from the child an (adaptive) interpretation, these 
objects become toys — would-be cars, houses, and creatures. The child is 
now acting at the pinnacle of his or her enactive capabilities, because he 
or she is bringing forth an alienated meaning through gestural schemas 
and then — and here lies the equally radical trick — submitting to the reality 
thus created through adaptive equilibration (the absence of which would 
make play unchallenging and  “ unreal ” ). 
 The combination of a concrete embodied situation with alienated 
virtual meaning is the freedom-engendering paradox of play. But it would 
not be a paradox if all there was to pretence was the manipulation of 
internal representations. This would result in no sense of ambiguity. Cog-
nitivism cannot explain fun. When the child becomes the regulator of 
play, the activity takes off as a proper form of life. The child explores the 
new freedom by following pleasurable activities, but at the same time, 
learns to generate new rules — new constraints that structure and reevaluate 
reality and that must be followed strictly (otherwise play becomes random 
and boring). The child is unhappy if he or she cannot bounce the ball 
more than the nine times managed so far. The norm is arbitrary, invented 
by the child, but in allowing his or her body to submit to it, it becomes 
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as serious as other social or biological norms. The player is the lawgiver 
and the rule-follower, the question maker and the responder. Play is 
thereby autonomous in the strict sense advocated by enactivism because 
it engenders a self-sustaining network of activities. 
 Pretending is only possible if a novel way of generating norms and 
values arises in conjunction with exploratory play. The best players are 
those that create new rules in a contextual manner so that they can con-
tinue to play and fun does not run down by exhausting the possibilities 
of the game. Rules are made up in play; they are solidifi ed versions of 
norms. Fun is the exploration of the limits thus imposed on bodily activity 
and social interaction. But when the possibilities are extinguished, the 
game becomes boring. Fun is also the change and revision of norms that 
reopen play. Over time, play is a self-structuring process governed by the 
dialectics of expansion and exhaustion of possibilities. Its freedom lies in 
the capability that players acquire of creating new meaningful (not arbi-
trary) constraints. The playful body is a new form of autonomous being — a 
novel mode of the cognitive self. It can now steer its sense-making activity 
and set new laws for itself and others to follow. This might help to answer 
the question we raised at the end of our discussion about embodiment in 
section 2.2.4. 
 We fi nd that play is an area particularly rich for the exploration of enac-
tive themes from emergence of identities and levels of social coordination, 
to manipulation of sense-making through experientially guided bodily 
action. Perhaps no other framework is better placed to explain play and 
its paradoxes, and this may be why there is such a paucity of references to 
play in cognitive science. When a child skillfully supplements the percep-
tual lack of similarity between a spoon and a car by making the spoon 
move and sound like a car, he or she has grasped in an embodied manner 
the extent to which perception can be action-mediated. With his or her 
body, the child can now alter sense-making activity, both on external 
objects, as well as his or her own actions and those of others. The child 
has become a practitioner of enactive  re-creation . 
 2.6  Conclusion 
 A proper extension of the enactive approach into a solid and mainstream 
framework for understanding cognition in all its manifestations will be a 
job of many and lasting for many years. This chapter has attempted only 
to point to specifi c directions and show that enactivism can be made into 
a coherent set of ideas, distinguishable from other alternatives, and that it 
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can provide the language to formulate problems and the tools to advance 
on issues that are sometimes out of the focal range of traditional perspec-
tives (if not in their blind spot). The strength of any scientifi c proposal will 
eventually be in how it advances our understanding, whether in the form 
of predictability and control, or in the form of synthetic constructions, 
models, and technologies for coping and interacting with complex systems 
such as education policies, methods for diagnosis, novel therapies, and so 
on. For this, it is crucial for ideas to be intelligible and promising. 
 In this respect, we would like to draw attention to the valuable role 
played by minimal models and experiments. Their function goes beyond 
the study of a given phenomenon. Minimal modeling provides crucial 
conceptual training that would be hard to obtain otherwise ( Beer 2003 ; 
 Harvey et al. 2005; Rohde 2010 ). Analytical thinking is at home with linear 
causality, well-defi ned and unchanging systems, and reduction. The alter-
natives of emergent, many-layered, causally spread, nonlinear systems in 
constant constitutive and interactive fl ux are very hard to manage concep-
tually. This is an important focus of resistance to many enactive ideas. It 
is here that synthetic modeling techniques may have their major impact: 
in producing novel ways of thinking and generating proofs of concept to 
show that some proposals may not be as coherent as they sound (as in our 
critical study on value system architectures) or to demonstrate that appar-
ently hazy concepts fi nd clear instantiations even in simple systems (as in 
the case of emergent coordination through social interaction processes). 
Methodological minimalism is, therefore, a key element contributing to 
the acceptability of enactive ideas. 
 Models that attempt to illuminate the enactive framework must take 
into account the core ideas of enactivism. A serious take on embodiment 
will depend on the extent to which a system ’ s behavior relies nontrivially 
on its body and its sensorimotor coupling with the environment as opposed 
to input/output information processing. Emergent properties and func-
tionality will contrast with misplaced localization in subagential modules. 
Autonomy, to the extent that it can be captured in simulation or robotic 
models, will depend on how the model instantiates the dynamics of self-
constituted precarious processes that generate an identity and how such 
processes create a normativity at the interactive level that leads to sense-
making. Enactive modeling must also relate to experience. As a scientifi c 
tool, it belongs to the realm of third person methods, so the relation will 
have to fi nd its place in the process of mutual constraining that has been 
proposed for the empirical sciences and fi rst person methods already 
mentioned. 
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 Alongside the explorations presented in this work and the horizons of 
questions, methods, and explanations that they open, there will be many 
other areas where enactive views could make a contribution. We repeat 
that we have not aspired to be exhaustive in neither breadth nor depth. 
But we do think that we have moved in the direction in which enactivism 
could grow the strongest: toward higher forms of cognition. Some of the 
ideas we have explored raise more questions than defi nitive answers. And 
this is as it should be in the current context. Focusing on the core concepts 
of enactivism has been a way of changing perspectives on well-known 
problems. This will inevitably lead to novel questions, which we have 
raised throughout the chapter. How do different modes of value-genera-
tion coexist in a human subject? How does sense-making get socially 
coordinated through different kinds of participation? How is the creation 
of novel meaning achieved in transitional activities such as play? Each of 
these areas indicates a direction in which much further work is needed and 
that might possibly lead to newer horizons. 
 Notes 
 1.  Emergence in this view is close to the notion proposed in  Thompson and Varela 
(2001) and  Thompson (2007) with the exception that our second requirement is 
there presented only as a possibility. We favor a stronger defi nition, because we 
want to emphasize the role of mutual causation in order to introduce a sharper 
contrast between enactivism and reductionism. 
 2.  This is a problem shared by other sensorimotor theories of social cognition such 
as those built upon the role of  “ mirror neurons ” ( Gallese 2001 ); additionally, such 
neural correlations themselves should be treated as suspect of the meaning reduc-
tion criticized in section 2.3. 
 3.  Interestingly, the agent ’ s behavior resembles the human behavior only if we 
include a delay between an agent ’ s encounter of an object and input to the neuro-
controller. If such a delay is not present, the agent ’ s position eventually converges 
to a fi xed point and stands still. This result raises an interesting question: why do 
participants keep oscillating around each other, rather than to just  “ stand on top 
of each other ” after recognition? Our model predicts that sensory delays play a role 
in this phenomenon and that the amplitude of the scanning oscillations around a 
target is positively correlated with the amount of delay. 
 4.  Although there is a paucity of research on play strictly from within cognitive 
science, important relevant works on the subject can be found in the fi elds of cul-
tural anthropology ( Schwartzman 1978 ), developmental psychology ( Sutton-Smith 
1997 ), phenomenology ( Fink 1968 ), animal behavior ( Fagen 1981 ), psychoanalysis 
( Winnicott 1971 ), and social science ( Goffman 1961 ;  Huizinga 1949 ). 
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